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“With an education, you become the white man’s equal.  Without it you 
remain his victim.”  
 
Crow Chief, Plenty Coups1 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 North Dakota can, according to oil tycoon Harold Hamm, become 
the next Saudi Arabia.2  He estimates that its Bakken oil and gas fields, 
once fully developed, will yield some twenty-four billion barrels of oil.3  
The on-going development of this gigantic and prolific oil field has already 
helped propel the United States into third place among the world’s oil 
producing nations.4  However, if North Dakota will soon become the next 
                                                 
1.  Douglas Nelson & Jeremy Johnston, Janine Pease Pretty-on-
Top/Crow, in THE NEW WARRIORS: NATIVE AMERICANS LEADERS SINCE 1900 (R. 
David Edmunds ed. 2004). 
2.  Stephen Moore, The Weekend Interview with Harold Hamm: How 
North Dakota Became Saudi Arabia, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2011, at A13. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Harold Hamm asserts that with the right set of national energy 
policies the United States could be “completely energy independent by the end of the 
decade.”  Id.  As befits “a man who thinks big,” he also claims that if the federal 
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Saudi Arabia, as Hamm claims, then the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 
which sits directly on top of the Bakken formation, deserves to be called 
little Saudi Arabia.5  
 My article, however, tells a somewhat less positive, but possibly 
more realistic, story of oil and gas development in North Dakota than the 
one told by Harold Hamm in his recent interview with the Wall Street 
Journal.  My goal is to assess whether oil and gas development on the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation—given those critical geographic, legal and 
socio-cultural differences which set it apart from the rest of North 
Dakota—will bring with it potentially devastating and unmanageable 
impacts that may overwhelm the tribal people of that reservation.  My 
article, therefore, seeks to fill an analytic gap in the existing oil and gas 
scholarship that has not, in my estimation, given sufficient regard to 
development’s unique risks and impacts in Indian Country. 
 Three interrelated phenomena help explain why large scale oil and 
gas development has come to western North Dakota and the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation.  First, the dramatic rise in the world price of oil has 
rendered it profitable to develop the oil and gas resources of the Bakken 
formation.6  Second, the use of two new, or re-adapted, oil and gas 
extraction technologies—horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing—
have made the development of that formation technically feasible.7  Third, 
the United States Geological Survey’s (“USGS”) recent substantial 
upward revision of its estimate of the potentially recoverable amount of 
oil and gas reserves in the Bakken formation piqued the interest of many 
hitherto wary development companies.8  
                                                 
government would allow more drilling on its lands and waters that it “could over time 
raise $18 trillion in royalties.”  Id. 
5.  See Eloise Ogden, Fort Berthold Reservation Prime Bakken Area, 
MINOT DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.mhanation.com/main/news/ 
2010/2010_04_ 27).  Veteran news reporter Eloise Ogden asserts that the Fort 
Berthold Reservation sits “right on top of the [geologic] formation thought to be the 
largest continuous oil reserve in the lower 48 states.”  Id.  She also reports that the 
United States Geological Survey now estimates that formation holds approximately 
three hundred billion barrels of oil.  Id. 
6.  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Spot Prices, EIA.GOV (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm. 
7. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Technology-Based Oil and Natural 
Gas Plans: Shale Shock! Could There Be Billions in the Bakken? 2, 5 (2006). 
8.  See LAWRENCE O. ANNA ET. AL., ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL 
AND GAS RESOURCES OF THE WILLISTON BASIN PROVINCE OF NORTH DAKOTA, 
MONTANA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA, FACT SHEET, U.S GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2008); see 
also U.S. Dep’t of Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, 3 to 4.3 Billions of Barrels of 
Technologically Recoverable Oil Assessed in North Dakota and Montana’s Bakken 
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 According to recent oil and gas statistics, the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation sits directly on top of some three hundred billion barrels of 
oil.9  Furthermore, given today’s relatively sophisticated extraction 
technologies, some experts estimate that over twenty-four billion barrels 
of oil can be economically recovered from the formation.10  In just the 
Mandaree and Shell Creek segments of the reservation alone, it is 
forecasted that some 1600 to 3000 new wells will be drilled over the next 
several years.11  Development’s present impact is demonstrated by the fact 
that over 2500 oil trucks a day use the reservation’s few, narrow, and now 
heavily damaged rural roadways.12  However, within two years, the level 
of truck usage is expected to at least triple to over 7500 oil trucks a day.13  
 My article’s thesis is that the tribal people confront quantitatively 
and qualitatively different risks and impacts from oil and gas development 
on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  Indeed, North Dakota and the 
federal government may take a different attitude towards this development 
because they, unlike the tribal people, are not directly confronted by its 
risks and impacts.  A brief assessment of these two governments’ attitudes 
toward development may help reveal their different perception of its 
impacts.  North Dakota sees oil and gas development in a generally 
positive light.  After all, the development brings with it high-paying jobs, 
                                                 
Formation—25 Times More than 1995 Estimate, USGS (Apr. 10, 2008), http:// 
www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1911. 
9.  See Ogden, supra note 5. 
10.  See Moore, supra note 2, at A13.  Harold Hamm estimates the 
Bakken field, at full development, will produce more than twenty-four billion barrels 
of oil.  Id.  He also claims that this oil and gas field “is almost twice as big as the oil 
reserves in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska.”  Id. 
11.  Jodi Rave, Fort Berthold Reservation to Provide Backdrop for 
International Discussion on Energy and Climate Change, TODAYMEDIANETWORK 
(June 30, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/30/fort-
berthold-reservation-to-provide-backdrop-for-international-discussion-on-energy-
and-climate-change-41176. 
12.  Eloise Ogden, Three Affiliated Tribes Ask BIA for Help with Highway 
Safety Issues, MINOTDAILYNEWS.COM (Feb. 22, 2011), http:// 
www.minotdailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/552162/Fort-Berthold-roads.html? 
nav=5010. 
13.  See North Dakota Flight Sparks Discussion on Impact of Oil Boom, 
LIGHTHAWK (Sept. 2010), http://www.lighthawk.org/WayPoint/WayPoint%20 
September% 202010.pdf.  Some commentators contend that too little attention has 
been paid to the non-economic impacts—including the public safety impacts—of oil 
development on the health and well being of both the tribal and non-tribal people of 
this region of North Dakota.  For example, the major reservation road, Highway 23 
that connects the reservation towns of New Town and Parshall, has the dubious 
reputation of being “the most dangerous road in the world without a bomb hidden on 
it.”  Id. 
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significant oil and gas revenues, and substantial funding for new social 
options for both its present day citizens as well as its future citizens.  For 
these very good reasons, North Dakota can afford to regard development’s 
impacts as presenting only manageable and highly localized effects within 
a contained, several countywide area, in the western part of that state.  It 
can also afford to manage its undesirable local effects through the 
provision of targeted financial aid to those impacted western counties.  Its 
financial goal is to, more or less, enable those local people to cope with 
those familiar boomtown-type impacts of large-scale development.  These 
local impacts include, for example, heavily damaged roads, overwhelmed 
school systems, overburdened municipal waste water treatment systems, 
soaring housing and food prices, new public safety needs, as well as the 
understandable culture shock of local residents who must deal with the 
influx of so many outside oil field workers and their families, who have 
migrated to the state from far flung parts of the nation.14  While many 
locals do welcome this development, there are also those long established 
farmers and ranchers who decry this development’s physical and social 
impacts on their communities and their cherished way of rural life.15  
 Yet, North Dakota also rightly asserts that it has wide-ranging 
                                                 
14.  An elderly lady’s sad situation, that of Ms. Lois Sinness, symbolizes 
the development related distress experienced by many of those local residents.  James 
Macpherson, Oil Boom Raises Rents, Pushes Seniors Out, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Nov. 16, 2011, at A4.  Lois had lived for eighty-two years in her hometown 
of Williston, North Dakota.  Id.  In November 2011, she left that town in tears, “towing 
a U-Haul packed with every possession.”  Id.  Her landlord had tripled her $700 a 
month rent due to the demand for housing that has been generated by the state’s oil 
boom.  Id.  However, many other elderly residents of Williston are in that same 
predicament.  Id.  Williston, like other oil boomtowns in western North Dakota, have 
been transformed into an “industrial park” with its once empty streets now “clogged 
with 18-wheelers.”  Id.  Ryan Holeywell contends the “Bakken boom has brought a 
population surge to the state, and the onslaught of new residents is straining public 
resources nearly to the breaking point.”  Ryan Holeywell, North Dakota’s Oil Boom 
is a Blessing and a Curse, GOVERNING (Aug. 2011), http:// 
www.governing.com/topics/energy-env/north-dakotas-oil-boom-blessing-curse.html.  
He also contends that “the other major impact of the industry is the damage to the 
country road system.”  Id.  He also cites a transportation study that “estimates that 
fixing the roads will require and investment of more than $900 million over the next 
20 years.”  Id.  However, he contends that the “biggest struggle in the region, though, 
is the shortage of housing.”  Id. 
15.  Rancher Donny Nelson “inherited his concerns about what drilling 
for oil might do to this wildest of North Dakota geography.”  Stephen J. Lee, Rancher 
Looks Back on Change to Family’s Land, RUNNING WITH OIL (Aug. 18, 2010), 
http:/www.runningwithoil.com/?p=416.  He recounts that “hydrogen sulfide from 
early oil wells [during the 1980s oil boom] sickened his uncle, killed the family’s 
cattle and corroded the barbed wire fences and steel buildings and equipment.”  Id. 
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regulatory authority over any foreseeable and undesirable environmental 
impacts that may arise in the future course of oil and gas development 
within the western part of the state.16  Furthermore, its environmental 
regulatory agencies do affirmatively monitor all aspects of the oil 
companies’ development and production processes and protocols so as to 
either avoid or to quickly remedy any substantial threat to the state’s 
environmental interests and values.17  These same agencies can, and have, 
levied hefty fines on those oil companies that have allowed substantial 
environmental damage to occur.18  
 North Dakota’s fulsome embrace of oil and gas development 
likely makes economic and socially rational sense.  However, my article’s 
goal is to assess whether the tribal people of the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation should greet the development with equal ardor.  Given this 
development’s potentially severe impacts on the tribal people’s 
environmental, public health, safety, and cultural interests, they must 
quickly develop those appropriate legal and regulatory means that will 
enable them to either avoid or reasonably mitigate these expected impacts. 
 The federal government, on the other hand, as evidenced by its 
Indian energy legislation, views oil and gas development on the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation as a legitimate means for helping the tribal 
                                                 
16.  See generally N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-08 (2004) (relating to control 
of gas and oil resources).  North Dakota statutorily prohibits the waste of its oil and 
gas resources.  Id. § 38-08-03.  It has also delegated to its oil and gas commission the 
regulatory jurisdiction and authority to enforce its oil and gas laws against all persons 
and property within the state.  Id. § 38-08-04.  Furthermore, the oil and gas 
commission is authorized to impose substantial civil penalties on any person who 
violates its rules, regulations, or orders.  Id. § 38-08-16(1). 
17.  Id. § 38-08-04; see also N.D. Indus. Comm., Dep’t of Mineral Res., 
North Dakota Oil and Gas Division, DMR, https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/ (last 
updated Aug. 18, 2012). 
18.  See Patrick Springer, Who’s in Charge?, RUNNING WITH OIL (Aug. 
16, 2010), http://www.runningwithout.com/?p=362.  A 2006 environmental 
disaster—a defective pipe spilled about a million gallons of highly concentrated salt 
water into Charbonneau Creek—“delivered a wake-up call to oil and gas regulators in 
North Dakota.”  Id.  In response, those regulators identified some 397 active oil wells 
that presented a serious risk of substantial oil or related contaminant based spills into 
the environment.  Id.  However, the required regulatory response to these risks has 
strained the state’s regulatory staff at its environmental health and oil and gas offices.  
Id.  Despite the strain, the regulators emphasize voluntary compliance on behalf of the 
oil and gas industry and use fines and fees as only a last resort.  Id.  Nonetheless, the 
regulators have levied some large fines on non-complying oil and gas companies as 
evidenced by the $171,750 fine levied against Zenergy Oil for the Charbonneau Creek 
spill.  Id.  
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people to achieve their goal of economic self-sufficiency.19  Furthermore, 
the federal government seems to regard oil and gas development 
throughout the United States as an appropriate means whereby the nation 
can achieve its long sought goal of energy independence.20  The federal 
government may also choose to use some of its oil and gas derived 
revenues to build America’s green energy future.21  
 However, today’s Indian energy legislation is deficient in 
providing two things that Indian tribes need the most to be able to 
successfully manage oil and gas development within their borders.  First, 
the legislation does not provide them with any new federally delegated 
authority to regulate the development’s risks and impacts within Indian 
Country.  Second, the legislation does not provide them with sufficient and 
readily available funding and technical assistance.  Without such federal 
help, the Indian tribes will likely be unable to fully develop their capacity 
to exercise regulatory oversight over development within Indian 
Country.22  Furthermore, the recent legislation also substantially limits 
federal liability for any new energy development initiatives that the tribes 
may undertake pursuant to these statutes.23  
 
II.  WHY DEVELOPMENT IS DIFFERENT ON THE FORT 
BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION 
 
 Fort Berthold’s geographic, legal, and socio-cultural differences 
set it apart from the rest of North Dakota.  These differences include place-
                                                 
19.  See Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-382, § 
1, 96 Stat. 1938, 1938 (1982) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–08 (2006)); Indian Tribal 
Energy and Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 503(a), 199 Stat. 594, 764 
(2005) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–06). 
20.  See Moore, supra note 2, at A13. 
21.  See id.  Harold Hamm recently discussed oil and gas development 
with President Obama.  Id.  He reports that Obama told him “oil and gas will be 
important for the next few years.  But we need to go on to green and alternative 
energy.”  Id.  Hamm, as well, decried the White House’s proposal to raise $40 billion 
in taxes in the oil and gas industry apparently to help fund the nation’s transition to its 
green energy future.  Id. 
22.  See Thomas H. Shipps, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: A Step 
Toward Self-Determination, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2007, at 55, 56 
(“Congress will never commit the resources needed to provide comprehensive, timely, 
and high-quality expertise to tribes as they evaluate and undertake mineral 
development.”). 
23.  Id. (contending that the most recent Indian energy statute declares 
that “[t]he United States shall not be liable, however, for losses suffered by a tribe 
from application of a negotiated term included in a lease, business agreement, or right-
of-way approved by a tribe pursuant to a [Tribal Energy Resource Agreement]”). 
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based considerations that motivated the federal government and the tribal 
people to agree to, in their 1886 treaty, set aside this geographic area for 
the exclusive use and occupancy of the Three Affiliated Tribes, now 
known as the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation.24  This area contains 
some of the tribal people’s most valued and revered sacred sites.  These 
considerations, among others, helped persuade the Three Affiliated Tribes 
to accept this remnant portion, less than one million acres in size, of its 
once vast tribal land holdings.25  The Three Affiliated Tribes’ original 
tribal homelands, established by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851, included 
more than 12.5 million acres and stretched from the Canadian border to 
the Powder River region of Wyoming.26  
 There are several practical facts that make development different 
on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  The reservation’s traditionally 
oriented, allottee owned, farming and ranching lands will bear the brunt of 
future oil and gas development.27  Also, the development will unevenly 
impact many small and interspersed reservation-based land holdings that 
are held in a variety of differing legal tenures (e.g., tribally-owned lands, 
federally-owned lands, allottee-owned lands, and non-Indian-fee-owned 
lands).28  Furthermore, the typical allotted mineral owner, due to the highly 
fractionated nature of her mineral interest, will generally receive only a 
small financial benefit from any oil and gas development that may occur 
on her lands.29  
 These practical facts alone may serve to distinguish development 
                                                 
24.  See Roy W. Meyer, Fort Berthold and the Garrison Dam, 35 J. N. 
PLAINS 223, 223 (Summer/Fall 1968).  A Bureau of Indian Affairs investigator 
remarked upon the tribal people’s great attachment to their lands, saying that the 
“[p]eople and land make a virtually unbroken social and geographic unit.”  Id. 
25.  See id. 
26.  Id. at 223–24.  The Treaty confirmed the tribal people’s “claim to the 
entire right bank of the Missouri from the mouth of the Heart River to the mouth of 
the Yellowstone, and to a vast hinterland enclosed by these streams and a vaguely 
described line from the mouth of the Powder River to the headwaters of the Heart.”  
Id. at 223. 
27.  Rave, supra note 11.  Lyle Gwin, a tribal environmental official, 
reported that between 1600 to 3000 oil and gas wells will soon be drilled in a 
traditionally oriented farming and ranching area—known as the Mandaree segment—
of the reservation.  Id. 
28.  Ogden, supra note 5.  “[Indian] allottees own about 320,000 acres 
and the tribe owns about 210,000 acres of almost all trust lands, with the rest a mixture 
of predominantly fee land, with some U.S. Army Corps of Engineers land also in it.”  
Id. 
29.  See id.  Ogden also asserts that due to the “highly fractionated 
[allottee-owned] land base, it [is] almost impossible for companies to gather the 
approval of all the landowners of any given tract.”  Id. 
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on Fort Berthold from elsewhere in North Dakota.  But other, less obvious, 
factors greatly magnify development’s impacts and risks on Fort Berthold.  
It is these less obvious factors that threaten to render development 
unmanageable on that reservation, including the tribal people’s binding 
geographic ties to Fort Berthold; the tribal people’s geographically 
constrained sovereign rights on Fort Berthold; and the tribal people’s 
longstanding socio-cultural ties to Fort Berthold. 
  
A. The Tribal People’s Unbreakable Geographic Ties to the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation 
 
 The Fort Berthold Indian Reservation is the last remnant of the 
tribal people’s once vast tribal homelands.  In 1851, their lands exceeded 
12.5 million acres in area and stretched from the present day Canadian 
border to the Powder River region of Wyoming.30  Their once vast tribal 
homelands were substantially diminished by a series of later federal 
treaties and land takings.31  Today, their remaining territory is less than 
one million acres in size, and much of the remaining acreage is owned in 
fee status by today’s descendants of the Scandinavian and other 
homesteaders who entered the reservation in the early twentieth century.32  
 Fort Berthold’s small land area, combined with the large scale of 
development now planned for that area, means that the tribal people will 
be directly confronted by development’s recurring risks and impacts.  
Indeed, many tribal people must already deal with these impacts on a daily 
basis.  Development, for them, has taken on a highly personalized and 
socially magnified character.  As development grows on Fort Berthold, 
many more tribal people will be required to adjust their historic ways of 
life to accommodate its ubiquitous presence.33  
                                                 
30.  Meyer, supra note 24, at 224. 
31.  Id. at 224–25. 
32.  The Indian Country Extension Service asserts that “353,790 acres are 
in [Fort Berthold’s] returned homestead area and farmed by private non-native 
farmers.”  Fort Berthold Extension, Indian Country Extension, http:// 
www.indiancountryextension.org/extension/office/fort-berthold-extension (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 
33.  A tribal member, Ms. Theodora Bird Bear, asserts that “Mandaree 
and New Town . . . are starting to experience the impacts of industrial energy 
development via [oil and gas] wellsites, fracking, pipelines, roads, a high volume of 
truck traffic, noise, and dust.”  North Dakota Flight Sparks Discussion on Impact of 
Oil Boom, supra note 13.  She also asserts “no local public discussion appears to 
recognize or give any value to the pre-existing landscape of wildlife, undisturbed 
prairie lands and badland-terrain on Fort Berthold.”  Id. 
VICTIM OR BENEFICIARY PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 1:03 PM 
 
  
258 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. Special Issue 
 When viewed in traditional environmental justice terms, 
development on Fort Berthold seems to impose a disproportionate 
environmental burden on vulnerable tribal people.34  However, the biggest 
potential adverse effect would be to erode the tribe’s status as an 
economically viable, and culturally intact, political entity.  Therefore, 
development, if it is not regulated in a legally and socially responsible 
manner, may threaten the tribe’s cherished political and legal rights as a 
federally recognized Indian tribe.  These larger tribal interests that may be 
threatened by unregulated development include the tribal people’s treaty-
based geographic ties to their lands; the tribal people’s geographic-based 
rights of territorial sovereignty over their lands; and the tribal people’s 
geographic-based socio-cultural ties to their lands. 
  
1. Their Treaty-Based Geographic Ties to Fort Berthold 
  
 The tribe is obligated, by its 1886 treaty, to use its tribally reserved 
lands, particularly its highly fertile farming and ranching lands along the 
Missouri River, as the means of achieving economic self-sufficiency.35  
The tribe’s past success in this regard provoked amazed comment from 
those social and economic experts who were asked by Congress, in 1949, 
to assess its progress toward the treaty goal.  They declared the tribal 
people to be, by 1949, “in sight of complete economic independence.”36  
Unfortunately, 1949 was also the year in which the federal government 
took the tribe’s best agricultural lands as the site for its mammoth Garrison 
Dam and reservoir project.37  
 The federal taking of over 156,000 acres of the tribe’s best 
                                                 
34.  “Environmental justice has been defined as the pursuit of equal 
justice and equal protection under the law for all environmental statutes and 
regulations without discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and/or socioeconomic 
status.”  What is Environmental Justice?, THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
INFORMATION PAGE, http://eelink.net/EJ/whatis.html (last modified Apr. 6, 1997). 
35.  The 1886 agreement between the tribal people and the United States 
arguably confirms the public welfare and governmental purposes of their reserved 
lands.  The agreement states the Indians will “become wholly self-supporting by the 
cultivation of the soil and other pursuits of husbandry.”  Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 
543, 26 Stat. 989, 1032. 
36.  RONALD G. CUMMINGS, VALUING THE RESOURCE BASE LOST BY THE 
THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES AS A RESULT OF LANDS TAKEN FROM THEM FOR THE 
GARRISON PROJECT 6 (1986) (unpublished report) (on file with the author).  The House 
Subcommittee on Public Lands concluded that the tribal people were, by 1949, “in 
sight of complete economic independence” due to their “strong and growing cattle 
industry and steadily expanding agricultural program.”  Id. 
37.  See Meyer, supra note 24, at 238. 
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agricultural lands substantially impaired the tribal people’s capacity to 
fulfill their treaty goals.  Nonetheless, the tribe has made remarkable 
progress in its efforts, over the intervening sixty years since that taking, to 
recover from its most debilitating impacts.38  Today, however, large-scale 
oil and gas development may again threaten to undermine the tribe’s 
progress towards economic self-sufficiency.  However, as discussed in 
Section V, if the tribe can assert effective regulatory control over that 
development, then oil and gas development’s most egregious risks and 
impacts may be avoided. 
  
2. Their Territorially-Based Rights of Sovereignty Within Fort Berthold 
  
 The tribal people are also legally tied to Fort Berthold by those 
territorially-based sovereign rights they exercise within its geographic 
confines.  Their sovereign rights arise from their status as a domestic, 
dependent nation under federal law.  As a quasi-sovereign tribal nation, 
the tribal people have the right to govern themselves.39  Their territorial 
sovereignty will be sorely tested by large-scale development on tribal 
lands, though, because development brings with it novel regulatory 
challenges that will test the tribal people’s sovereignty in new ways.  
Further, the tribe will doubtless encounter substantial legal and political 
barriers if it seeks to regulate development within the reservation, 
particularly that development which will occur on fee status lands within 
the reservation. 
 
3. Their Socio-Cultural Ties to Fort Berthold 
  
 The tribe’s creation stories tell of how Lone Man and First Creator 
selected the Fort Berthold lands as the tribal people’s permanent 
homelands.40  By the people’s continuing re-enactment of their cultural 
                                                 
38.  See Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Equitable 
Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3503, 106 Stat. 4600, 4732 (1992).  Their 
recovery from the taking was spurred, in part, by the $149.2 million in equitable 
compensation awarded to them by a 1992 congressional act.  Id. § 3504.  Congress 
required compensation be paid out of the hydro-power receipts derived from the future 
sales of electrical power from the Pick-Sloan generation plants, thereby effectively 
internalizing the compensation cost into that project’s future operations.  Id. 
39.  Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959). 
40.  Joseph E. DeFlyer, From Creation Stories to ‘49 Songs: Cultural 
Transactions with the White World as Portrayed in Northern Plains Indian Story and 
Song, 2 STUD. IN AM. INDIAN LITERATURE 11, 11–12 (Spring 1990) (characterizing 
these Indian people as “the ‘urban’ people of the northern plains”).  The tribes in what 
is now North Dakota “were traders, businessmen, and agriculturalists, with their 
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and religious practices, they strive to renew their ties to these lands and to 
help secure the creator’s continued blessing for their good uses of those 
lands.  Indeed, the tribal people’s tenacious and steady efforts to use the 
entrusted lands for their common benefit have provoked an intriguing 
comment from one astute historian, Roy Meyer.  He was amazed by the 
Three Affiliated Tribe’s ingenious agriculturally based efforts to wrest a 
living from what some people regarded as a hostile and unforgiving 
environment.  He attributed the tribe’s success to their long-standing sense 
of duty and commitment to use these lands as a means of growing as a 
tribal people.41  
 Yet, today, even tough-minded economists do acknowledge a 
tribe’s unique social and economic uses of their reserved lands can be 
taken into account when courts are called on to assess those lands’ in situ,42 
“or its natural and undisturbed” value to an affected tribal people.43  
Indeed, the Three Affiliated Tribe’s people have persuaded Congress, 
                                                 
sizeable villages located strategically in the center of a huge Northern Plains trading 
area.”  Id.  DeFlyer recounts how First Creator and Lone Man cooperated to create the 
tribe’s homelands.  Id. at 12.  He states the two creator figures divided up their 
responsibilities so that: 
 
Lone Man create[d] the type of land and animals allied with the 
traditional Hidatsa and Mandan lifestyle of limited floodplain 
farming and fairly extensive hunting, while First Creator create[d] 
the type of land and animals allied with the modern whiteman’s 
lifestyle of mechanical farming, and fenced, more intensive stock 
grazing. The tone of the story is light-hearted and satirical, though 
some people can, indeed, become angered or hurt by reference to 
the red-headed maggots as the progenitors of the white people. 
 
Id. at 13. 
41.  Meyer, supra note 24, at 233.  Historian Meyer concluded that the 
tribal people had made a “satisfactory adjustment to [a forbidding country and climate] 
during the centuries they had lived in the Upper Missouri Valley.”  Id.  He also 
concluded that they had become “even more attached” to those lands over time and 
that they made full use of all the available resources of their reservation including “the 
wild game, the fruits and berries, the timber that grew in the river bottoms and along 
the tributary ravines, [and] the lignite coal found here and there in readily accessible 
form.”  Id. 
42. In situ is latin for “in the natural or original position.”  WEBSTER’S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1170 (2002). 
43.  CUMMINGS, supra note 36, at 12–14.  Natural resource economist, 
Ronald G. Cummings, asserts the United States Supreme Court has expanded the 
reach and scope of the substitute valuation doctrine as it applies to unique or 
irreplaceable lands or resources that are not traded on any market or have elements of 
value that transcend market value.  Id. 
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through their presentation of expert economic studies and testimony, that 
their established aboriginal and treaty uses of their taken lands must be 
evaluated as representing dedicated governmental or public welfare 
facilities that are protected by an alternative valuation standard that is now 
known as the substitute valuation doctrine.44  
 The tribe’s distinctive ties to the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
distinguish and separate it from the rest of North Dakota.  However, 
whether the tribe’s distinctive ties to their homelands, as embodied by their 
unique sovereign and political rights within their reservation, can be 
adequately protected from development’s overweening risks and impacts 
remains to be seen.  The tribe, I contend, can protect those distinctive 
rights and interests through the development and implementation of those 
legal and regulatory initiatives that I discuss in my article. 
  
B. Fort Berthold’s Legally-Based Differences from the Rest of North 
Dakota 
 
 Today, the tribe may exercise a degree of civil regulatory 
authority, but no criminal jurisdictional authority, over non-Indians’ 
                                                 
44.  See S. Rep. No. 102-250, at 8–9 (1992) (recommending a do-pass for 
the “Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe Equitable Compensation 
Act”).  Three Affiliated Tribes argued successfully that Congress, in its 1949 taking 
act, had significantly undervalued the tribe’s resource base that had been taken as the 
site for the Garrison Dam and reservoir.  Id. at 5–6.  Therefore, the appropriate way to 
correct this mistake would be to regard the tribe’s land related losses as an unpaid 
project cost.  Id. at 9.  The tribe argued that this unpaid project cost could, and should, 
be repaid out of the Pick-Sloan Project’s excess power revenues.  Id.  The 
congressional sponsors of the tribe’s equitable compensation bill had the following 
language, based on this recoupment principle, inserted into congressional report that 
accompanied this bill.  That language reads as follows: 
 
Paragraph 2 of [section 4(a) of Senate Bill 168] provides that 
deposits equal to 25 percent of the receipts from deposits to the 
United States Treasury for the preceding fiscal year from the 
integrated programs of the Eastern Division of the Pick-Sloan 
Missouri River Basin Project shall be deposited automatically into 
the fund each fiscal year.  The amounts appropriated are to be non-
reimbursable and non-returnable.  [But] the aggregate amount of 
deposits into the Recovery Fund shall not exceed $149,200,000. 
 
Id. at 8–9.  This stated compensatory principle was embodied, without any change, in 
the final compensation act.  See Three Affiliated Tribes and Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe Equitable Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, § 3503, 106 Stat. 4600, 4732 
(1992). 
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activities within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.45  The jurisdictional 
reality is illustrated by the tribe’s recent response to the deaths of four 
members of an Indian family.  They lost their lives in a collision with an 
oil truck driven by a non-Indian employee of an oil company.46  Given that 
the tribe lacks criminal jurisdiction over any non-Indian who violates its 
criminal laws, it chose to amend its existing tribal motor vehicle ordinance 
so as to assert its civil regulatory jurisdiction over those non-Indian vehicle 
operators who violate the civil ordinance’s requirements.47  However, 
even this modest assertion of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian 
defendants will likely be vociferously challenged as outside the tribe’s 
subject matter jurisdiction within Indian Country. 
 While this legal state of affairs may shock some people’s 
conscience, it is not surprising given the unsettled state of today’s federal 
Indian law.  Federal Indian law refers to that body of federal law that 
includes Indian treaties, federal Indian statutes, federal Indian law 
decisions, Indian executive orders, as well as the administrative decisions 
and rules rendered by federal Indian agencies.48  However, important for 
this article is the federal Indian law that governs a tribe’s legal authority 
over non-Indian activities within Indian Country. 
 Briefly stated, the Three Affiliated Tribes, like other federally 
recognized Indian tribes, may exercise two types of jurisdictional authority 
over non-Indian defendants within Indian Country: jurisdictional authority 
that stems from its inherent sovereign rights as a quasi-sovereign entity 
under federal Indian law, and jurisdictional authority that stems from its 
federally delegated powers.49  These two types of jurisdictional authority 
allow the Three Affiliated Tribes to exercise a fair degree of regulatory 
authority over non-Indians’ activities within the Fort Berthold 
Reservation.  However, a United States Supreme Court decision has 
                                                 
45.  See Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978). 
46.  See Tribes Pass Special Resolution Enforcing Civil Motor Vehicle 
Code on Reservation Roads After Family of Four Dies on Highway, MANDAN, 
HIDATSA, & ARIKARA NATION (Sept. 20, 2011), http:// 64.38.12.138/News/2011/ 
09/21/mha092011.pdf. 
47.  Id.  Tribal attorney Jennifer Fyten said the tribe has “civil jurisdiction 
and that the Tribe does intend to fully enforce the new Code and [tribal] law 
enforcement will stop, cite, investigate and possibly detain all individuals” who 
violate this law.  Id. 
48.  The leading Indian law casebook defines federal Indian law as that 
“distinct body of law that regulates the legal relationship between Indian tribes and 
the United States.”  DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW 1 (6th ed. 2011). 
49.  FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01(1)(a), 
206 (2005). 
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restricted the tribes’ inherent authority to regulate non-Indians’ activities 
to two jurisdictional circumstances: when the regulated non-Indian 
activity arises from a consensual agreement between the non-Indian 
defendant and the tribe, or when the regulated non-Indian activity poses a 
direct and substantial threat to the tribe’s health, welfare or political 
integrity.50  
 Additionally, the Indian tribes may exercise certain federally 
delegated powers over non-Indian activities within Indian Country.  For 
example, Congress has delegated to the tribes the authority to regulate 
specific environmental risks and impacts that may result from non-Indian 
development within Indian Country.51  However, Congress has not 
amended all of the federal environmental statutes so as to authorize the 
tribes to regulate all aspects of non-Indian development within Indian 
Country.52  
 Therefore, the Three Affiliated Tribes will likely face an uphill 
legal battle if it seeks to hold oil and gas developers, as well as their 
employees, legally accountable for those wrongs they may inflict on the 
tribal people.  However, I contend that it may, nonetheless, be able to 
develop and enforce a tribal energy policy that will enable it to regulate 
most aspects of oil and gas development on the reservation.  I later 
describe how the tribe may act to accomplish this regulatory goal, as well 
as other goals, in the next several sections of my paper. 
  
 
 
                                                 
50.  Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1981). 
51.  Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The 
Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 625 (1993).  
Royster states that: 
 
[b]etween 1986 and 1990, three of the major environmental laws 
were amended to treat tribes as states (TAS).  These TAS 
provisions were added to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act: those federal environmental laws 
that encourage or mandate states to take primacy for the 
environmental programs established in the statutes.  Tribes that 
meet certain statutory and regulatory criteria are delegated 
essentially the same authority to administer programs as a state. 
 
Id. 
52.  Id. at 628 (concluding that the “tribal governmental regulation of the 
environmental effects of mining and related activities will generally extend beyond 
mineral development [on Indian lands] to reach all mineral development within the 
tribe’s governmental boundaries, including mining on allotted lands and fee lands”). 
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III.  THE TRIBE’S THREE BIG CHALLENGES 
 
 Development experts urge energy rich tribes to enact policies that 
will enable them to manage development within Indian Country.53  The 
experts assert these policies will help those tribes to maximize 
development’s benefits, and minimize its eco-social costs, to the tribal 
people.54  Unfortunately, the experts do not say what those policies should 
look like or how the tribal governments can legally or practicably 
implement them.55  Given this omission, their hortatory admonitions may 
be of limited value to the energy rich tribes. 
  However, my practical goal is to assess whether the Three 
Affiliated Tribes can, in fact, develop and enforce a tribal energy policy 
that will maximize development’s benefits, and minimize its eco-social 
costs, to the tribal people of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  To do 
so, I argue the tribe must overcome three daunting barriers to its realization 
of this goal.  For exposition purposes, I have re-characterized these three 
barriers as representing three big challenges. 
 First is the tribe’s legal challenge.  The Three Affiliated Tribes 
must effectively assert its inherent and statutorily conferred legal powers 
over oil and gas development throughout the Fort Berthold Indian 
                                                 
53.  See MAURA GROGAN ET AL., NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS AND 
NATURAL RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 41 (2011), available at http:// 
www.revenuewatch.org/publications/native-american-lands-and-natural-resource-
development.  There is a mixed blessing to the development occurring on the Fort 
Berthold Indian Reservation.  On the positive side, the tribe and its members have 
“been paid more than $180 million” in energy-derived income.  Id.  But, on the 
negative side: 
 
To say that the momentum of the Northern Plains’ oil boom has 
overwhelmed the Three Affiliated Tribes is an understatement.  For 
one, the reservation’s infrastructure—particularly its roads—
cannot adequately accommodate the increased traffic and heavy 
equipment accompanying the rush to develop the Bakken shale 
formation.  In part to increase funding for infrastructure 
improvements, the tribe’s reelected chairman, Tex Hall, has stated 
his interest in renegotiating the tribe’s current 50/50 tax sharing 
arrangement with the state to an 80/20 split in favor of Three 
Affiliated. 
 
Id. 
54.  Id. at 6–7, 41. 
55.  See id. at 42 (noting “Indian nations and their lands exist in a strange 
legal status” but, unfortunately, not explaining how those tribes could, or should, use 
their distinctive legal status as a means of developing and implementing an appropriate 
set of tribal energy policies within Indian Country). 
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Reservation.  Second, the tribe has a strategic challenge.  The Three 
Affiliated Tribes must maximize development’s benefits, and minimize its 
eco-social costs, to the tribal people by adopting strategies that include: 
(1) a strategy for effective inter-governmental relations with the federal 
and state governments; (2) a strategy for effective financial and business 
action that will grow its oil and gas derived income into a permanent and 
diversified tribal wealth fund; and (3) a strategy of new political and social 
engagements with its tribal communities as those responsible and active 
stakeholders who can use development’s benefits as their means of 
growing their social and human capital resources.  Finally, there is the 
tribe’s governmental challenge.  The Three Affiliated Tribes must 
establish an energy regulatory authority that can enforce the tribe’s 
conservation-based rules so as to prevent the undue physical and economic 
waste of its oil and gas resources.  The regulatory authority must also 
ensure the timely and effective prevention, or the subsequent remediation, 
of any significant development related damage to the tribe’s waters, air, 
public health, livestock, or wildlife resources. 
  
A. How the Three Affiliated Tribes Can Meet Its Legal Challenge 
 
1. Overview 
  
 In order to meet its legal challenge, the tribe must thoroughly 
evaluate its inherent and federally delegated authority to regulate 
development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  The legal review 
should include: (1) a review of the tribe’s 1886 treaty, as well as its other 
agreements, with the federal government; (2) a review of those federal 
environmental statutes, as well as any other relevant federal statutes, that 
may authorize the tribe to regulate development on the reservation; and 
(3) a review of those federal Indian law decisions that may affect the 
tribe’s authority to impose its civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian 
activities within the reservation.  The purpose of this legal review is to 
provide the tribe with a reliable overall assessment of its potential 
authority to regulate development within the reservation. 
 At the practical level, the tribe should also evaluate its possible 
regulatory options whereby it can assert a reasonable measure of authority 
over all aspects of development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  
For example, the 2004 Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act,56 as well as 
                                                 
56. See David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and 
Gas Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 766 
(2009).  Professor David Pierce views the 2004 Model Act as offering a “laudable 
improvement of exploratory unitization.”  But he nonetheless concludes that it “retains 
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other regulatory models, are one possible option for its assertion of 
regulatory authority over development.  However, any potential regulatory 
model would have to be significantly adapted to meet the tribal people’s 
distinctive regulatory needs and interests on the reservation.  The tribe may 
also seek the advice of those federal Indian agencies—such as the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”), and 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—that have the trust-based 
duty to assist the tribe in its efforts to protect its oil and gas resources from 
any unauthorized injury.57  
  
2. Analysis of the Tribe’s Regulatory Authority over Development on the 
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
  
 My brief legal analysis of the tribe’s authority over development 
has to begin with its acknowledged proprietorship-based right to protect 
its lands and resources from unauthorized damage or depredation.  Further, 
its proprietorship-based powers have been strengthened by Indian 
environmental and energy statutes.58  Congress, for example, has recently 
amended most of the major environmental statutes so as to authorize the 
tribe to exercise regulatory authority over its environmental resources 
within Fort Berthold.59  The tribe is now statutorily empowered to protect 
its lands, waters, air shed and wildlife within the reservation.60  
                                                 
at its core the basic right to go-it-alone on a capture basis unless you can assemble a 
super-majority of like-minded working interest owners and royalty owners.”  Id.; see 
also Model Oil & Gas Conservation Act (2004), available at http:/ 
www.iogcc.state.ok.us/Websites/iogcc/docs/ModelAct-Dec2004.pdf. 
57.  The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the “distinctive obligation of 
trust incumbent upon the government” and that requires the government's conduct to 
“be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.”  Seminole Nation v. United 
States, 316 U.S. 286, 296–97 (1942). 
58.  See, e.g., Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, 25 U.S.C. §§ 
2101–08 (2006) (relating to Indian mineral statutes); Indian Tribal Energy and Self-
Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–06 (same); Clean Water Act, Pub. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1377 (providing tribes as states (TAS) amendments to federal environmental 
statutes); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j–11 (same); Clean Air Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 7601(d) (same). 
59. Royster, supra note 51, at 628 (asserting “tribal governmental 
regulation of the environmental effects of mining and related activities will generally 
extend beyond mineral development on Indian lands to reach all mineral development 
within the tribe’s governmental boundaries, including mining on allotted lands and fee 
land”). 
60. Other Indian tribes, such as the Confederated Salish and Kootenai 
Tribe and Isleta Pueblo, have already exercised their newly delegated authority to 
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 Additionally, there are other recently enacted federal Indian 
statutes that may provide an even stronger legal basis for the tribe’s 
regulation of development within its reservation.  These two potentially 
stronger statutes are the 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act 
(“IMDA”)61 and the 2005 Indian Tribal Energy and Self-Determination 
Act (“ITESDA”).62  The IMDA, for example, authorizes the Three 
Affiliated Tribes to set such terms and conditions in its development 
agreement as it may deem appropriate for the efficient and responsible 
development of its oil and gas resources.63  
 Not surprisingly, the tribe has already used its new statutory 
authority to shed its erstwhile role as the passive recipient of limited 
income payments (e.g., bonus lease payments, annual rental payments, or 
royalty based payments).64  Today, the tribe has utilized its authority to 
enter into a wide variety of development agreements.  Its goal is to now 
participate directly in the value added phases of oil and gas development.  
For example, the tribe has become the owner/operator of several of its oil 
and gas wells.65  
 The best example of its new development role, though, may be its 
                                                 
establish stringent water quality standards to protect their various water sources within 
their respective reservations.  See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 48, at 640. 
61. Id. at 587–88 (contending the IMDA authorizes the Indian tribes to 
enter into mineral development agreements that “provide for enhanced, environmental 
controls, or tribal employment preferences, education and job training programs, 
contracting of tribal businesses for related services such as road maintenance and 
security, and acquisition of equipment once production is completed”). 
62. See Shipps, supra note 22, at 56 (contending the ITESDA “creates a 
mechanism pursuant to which tribes may, ultimately, be allowed to grant energy-
related leases (primary terms not to exceed ten years), enter into energy-related 
business agreements (terms not to exceed thirty years), and issue rights-of-way for 
pipelines and electric transmission facilities (not to exceed thirty years) involving 
tribal lands with specific approval of the Secretary of the Interior”). 
63. See Ogden, supra note 5 (stating the tribe has used its IMDA 
authority to enter into much more favorable energy development agreements; for 
example, the tribe’s new energy leases under the IMDA has garnered it “bonuses in 
excess of $700 per acre, drilling commitments and 22.5 percent royalty rate”). 
64. See Chuck Haga, It’s in Their Hands, RUNNING WITH OIL (Aug. 19, 
2010), http://www.runningwithoil.com/?p+46.  The tribe, pursuant to its new statutory 
authority, now negotiates directly with the oil and gas companies to obtain new tribal 
employment, training, and management responsibilities and opportunities in 
connection with the development of oil and gas resources on tribally owned lands. 
65. Id.  Malcolm Wolf, deputy director of the tribal energy department, 
told a recent visitor to a tribally owned and operated oil well, “We’re in charge here . 
. . . We’re doing our own leases, our own negotiations, our own pumping.  It puts us 
in the driver’s seat.  Many of our people are having things they didn’t have before, 
and that gives us a little more confidence in ourselves.”  Id. 
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endeavor to construct the first tribally owned and managed oil and gas 
refinery in the nation.  It has apparently received final federal project 
approval so that it can move forward with obtaining the capital financing 
that is needed for the project.66  However, the bigger question is whether 
the tribe can leverage its new authority as its means for regulating 
development throughout the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 
  
3. How the Three Affiliated Tribes Can Leverage Its Authority to 
Regulate Development Throughout the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation 
  
 The tribe has used its proprietorship-based authority to secure a 
larger share of the financial and employment-based benefits that have 
arisen from oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation.  However, it has not yet sought to ensure that its energy 
resources are developed in the most efficient and socially responsible 
manner possible.  It could do so, in part, by its insertion of terms and 
conditions within its development agreements that would require 
developers to: (1) use the best available development protocols and 
extraction technologies that would help ensure the efficient and safe 
recovery of the tribe’s resources; (2) adopt the best available management 
practices and environmentally friendly technologies so as to avoid or 
minimize any environmental risks to surrounding Indian owned resources; 
and (3) incorporate by reference into its development agreements its 
evolving environmental and conservation related requirements that seek to 
ensure the responsible development of its resources.67  
 The tribe may also seek the financial and technical assistance of 
the federal government to design and enforce a model tribal oil and gas 
conservation agreement.  The purpose of a model agreement would be to 
ensure the efficient and socially responsible development of the tribe’s oil 
and gas resources.  Additionally, the tribe could also seek—through its use 
of various federal-tribal agreements (e.g., self-determination contracts, 
memoranda of understanding, or co-management compacts)—to assume 
the administration of the federal regulatory programs that oversee Indian 
energy development within the reservation.  If sought and accomplished, 
the tribe could secure a larger participatory role in the responsible and 
                                                 
66. See Reese Rogers, Refinery Construction Begins on North Dakota 
Reservation, STANFORD U. (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.stanford.edu/group/ 
ruralwest/cgi.bin/drupal/energy/refinery-fort-berthold (asserting the refinery “is a 
source of some pride now that the refinery is to be owned and operated by the Three 
Affiliated Tribes, providing jobs for tribal members and much needed income for the 
reservation”). 
67. Royster, supra note 51, at 587–88. 
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coordinated development of all the Indian owned energy resources within 
the reservation.68  However, while the tribe’s proprietorship-based and 
statutorily delegated powers may well empower it to manage development 
on tribally owned lands, its powers may not authorize it to regulate 
development on the fee status lands within the reservation.69  
  
4. How the Tribe Can Use Its Inherent and Federally Delegated 
Authority to Regulate Development on the Fee Status Lands Within the 
Reservation 
  
 The tribe is legally authorized to assert its civil regulatory 
jurisdiction over certain developmental activities on fee status lands within 
the reservation.  As a general rule, it is authorized to regulate any non-
Indian activities that present a direct and substantial threat to the tribe’s 
health, welfare, political or economic security.70  Therefore, the tribe 
should evaluate those types of developmental activities, whether on fee 
status lands or not, that may pose a direct and substantial threat to a 
protected tribal interest.  If the risk-based evaluation of those activities 
reveals any substantial threats to important tribal interests, the tribe should 
take the further step of determining what its regulatory response should be 
to either avoid or to mitigate those identified threats. 
 The tribe has two possible regulatory options whereby it can act 
to avoid or to mitigate a substantial threat to a protected tribal interest.  Its 
strongest option, but also likely its most labor intensive option, may be to 
invoke its federally delegated regulatory powers under the federal 
environmental statutes.71  However, in doing so, the tribe may be required 
to develop, subject to EPA’s approval and oversight, a comprehensive 
tribal environmental regulatory code that would cover its air shed, its 
                                                 
68. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 48, at 241 (describing the larger tribal 
challenge as that of “[b]uilding a sustainable economy, competing with federal and 
state governments for jurisdiction and control over reservation resources and business 
activity, training the reservation workforce, [and] respecting tribal beliefs, traditions 
and values.”). 
69. While the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority enables it to regulate 
development on Indian trust lands, it does not necessarily authorize the tribe to 
regulate development on non-Indian owned, fee status lands within the Fort Berthold 
Reservation.  However, the tribe is authorized to regulate non-Indian development 
activity that poses a direct and substantial threat to that tribe’ political or economic 
security.”  See Montana v. United States, 580 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).  
70. Id.  
71. Royster, supra note 51, at 628 (contending that tribal regulation of 
the environmental effects of mining extends to “mining on allotted lands and fee 
lands”). 
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waters, its wildlife, as well as its traditional cultural resources.72  
 The tribe’s more limited regulatory option, but also its more 
legally uncertain option, may be to assert civil regulatory jurisdiction over 
any non-Indian developmental activity that would present a direct and 
substantial threat to a protected tribal interest.  Two recent federal 
appellate court decisions have upheld, in circumstances involving fairly 
egregious instances of non-Indian misconduct, tribal regulation of non-
Indian activities within Indian Country.73  However, in the absence of 
similarly egregious non-Indian misconduct, the Three Affiliated Tribes 
would likely have to present credible and detailed evidence that clearly 
demonstrates how and why a given non-Indian’s conduct presents a direct 
and substantial threat to a protected tribal interest.  Under this alternative 
tribal regulatory option, the tribe may even have greater remedial options, 
such as money damages, than may be available to it under the more limited 
remedial framework of environmental law.74  
 The tribe faces a daunting legal challenge if it chooses to regulate 
oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  
However, given its combined inherent and statutorily delegated powers, it 
does have a reasonable legal basis for its potential exercise of regulatory 
authority over many, if not all, of development’s risks and impacts within 
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  The next section of my article 
addresses how the tribe can meet its equally daunting challenge of 
managing development’s benefits for the good of its tribal people.  While 
this Article has emphasized the tribe’s role in managing development’s 
costs and risks to the tribal people, the next part will focus on how it can 
meet its challenge of maximizing development’s benefits to the tribal 
people.  Specifically, I will argue the tribe can leverage development’s 
benefits in a manner that will spur the growth of the tribal people’s human 
and social capital resources. 
                                                 
72. See EPA Tribal Policy and Initiatives, EPA, http:// 
www.epa.gov/Indian/wetg/training/EPA/common/data/text-only/Old/epa01c.htm 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2012). 
73. See Attorney’s Process & Investigation Servs., Inc. v. Sac & Fox 
Tribe, 609 F.3d 927, 939 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding a tribal court jurisdiction over a 
tribal trespass claim against a non-Indian security firm, stating the security firm 
“threatened the health and welfare of the Tribe by organizing a physical attack . . . 
[on] the Tribe’s facilities and the tribal members inside, including the duly elected 
council”); White Mountain Apache Tribal Court v. Elliott, 566 F.3d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 
2009) (upholding tribal court jurisdiction over a non-Indian civil defendant who 
contributed to the largest fire in Arizona’s history that destroyed 400,000 acres of 
lands and did millions of dollars in damage to the tribe’s resources). 
74. See e.g., Pubelo of Isleta v. Universal Constructors, 570 F.2d 300, 
303 (10th Cir. 1978) (noting trial court can “fashion a method for awarding damages”). 
VICTIM OR BENEFICIARY PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 1:03 PM 
 
 
2017 VICTIM OR BENEFICIARY? 271 
 
B. How the Three Affiliated Tribes Can Meet Its Strategic Challenges 
 
1. Overview 
  
 Development experts tend to focus much of their attention on an 
energy tribe’s wise management of its oil and gas derived income.75  Wise 
management is an important issue, but I argue that an energy tribe can also 
leverage its income to achieve a much broader set of important strategic 
goals.  Therefore, the Three Affiliated Tribes can, and should, use its 
energy-derived income as its means to achieve several strategic goals.  It 
may do so, in part, by considering these following strategic initiatives: its 
strategy for effective inter-governmental relations, conducted on the basis 
of mutual respect and shared interests, with the state and federal 
governments; its strategy for using its governmental and corporate powers 
to leverage its oil and gas derived income into a permanent and diversified 
tribal wealth fund for the long-term benefit of its tribal people; and its 
strategy for engaging the tribal people and communities as socially and 
politically responsible stakeholders who must directly share in the task of 
rebuilding the tribe’s families, economy, traditional cultural societies, and 
educational systems. 
 
2. The Tribe’s New Inter-Governmental Relations Strategy 
  
 As an energy rich tribe, the Three Affiliated Tribes may re-think 
its past inter-governmental relationships with both the state and federal 
governments.  A reassessment is necessary because its strategic goals and 
interests have likely changed given its new economic status as a leading 
energy tribe.76  Of course, its inter-governmental relations should still be 
premised on the principle of mutual respect for the sovereign and 
legitimate interests of each of the participating governmental authorities 
including itself, North Dakota, and the federal government. 
 The tribe has enjoyed a longstanding government-to-government 
relationship with the federal government.77  However, it has had a more 
                                                 
75. See GROGAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 56 (citing the Southern Ute 
Tribe’s establishment of a permanent fund and growth fund that “invests energy 
royalties and casino profits in securities, which generate a steady revenue to pay for 
governmental and social services” and the tribe’s distribution of “payments on a per 
capita basis as dividends to tribal citizens between the ages of 26 and 59, and as a 
retirement benefit to those 60 and older”). 
76. Id. at 39–40. 
77. The tribe’s long standing relationship with the United States is 
confirmed in author Paul VanDevelder’s recounting of how “Captains Meriwether 
VICTIM OR BENEFICIARY PROOF (Do Not Delete) 9/9/2017 1:03 PM 
 
  
272 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. Special Issue 
uneven, and sometimes contentious, relationship with North Dakota.78  
Due to the large scale energy development that is now occurring in western 
North Dakota and on Fort Berthold, the tribe will have to work with the 
state to ensure the efficient and responsible development of their shared 
energy resources.  For that reason, a renewed and more effective inter-
governmental relationship between the tribe and state may be one means 
of achieving their goals without undue legal or political differences. 
 However, the tribe should recall that there are different 
considerations at play in its relations with the federal government, on the 
one hand, and North Dakota, on the other hand.  Its renewed inter-
governmental relationship with federal Indian trust agencies—particularly 
the BIA, the BLM, and the EPA—will be governed by an established and 
relatively formal regime of inter-governmental consultations and resulting 
agreements.  For example, this system of relations will likely be conducted 
through tribal-federal consultations, legally binding memoranda of 
understanding, tribal self-determination contracts, negotiated tribal 
regulatory standards, and the occasional tribal testimony before Indian 
congressional committees.79  
 By contrast, its renewed inter-governmental relations with North 
Dakota will be likely conducted through an informal system of occasional 
                                                 
Lewis and William Clark, the leaders of Thomas Jefferson’s Corps of Discovery,” 
were welcomed to the Mandan and Hidatsa villages in the winter of 1805.  See PAUL 
VANDEVELDER, COYOTE WARRIOR: ONE MAN, THREE TRIBES AND THE TRIAL THAT 
FORGED A NATION 7 (2004). 
78. See id. at 187.  Author Paul VanDevelder describes North Dakota’s 
contentious relationship with the Three Affiliated Tribes during that long and drawn 
out litigation cycle of cases involving the tribe and Wold Engineering.  Id.; see 
generally Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986); Three 
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138 (1984).  Chief Justice 
VandeWalle of the North Dakota Supreme Court described the impact of these cases 
on tribal-state relations in North Dakota as follows: 
 
When Wold Engineering came in the door, I remember thinking 
“Oh brother, here comes the train wreck.”  This was going to be a 
watershed case, a referendum on Public Law 280, no doubt about 
it.  So we told the tribe we have no jurisdiction to resolve this thing.  
The only way we could hear this case was if the tribe waived its 
sovereign immunity.  Short of that, we couldn’t give them relief.  
They had to take it to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
 
VANDEVELDER, supra note 77, at 187. 
79. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 48, at 222 (praising Congress’ tribal self-
determination initiatives which authorize the Indian tribes to “administer virtually all 
functions and activities now performed for them by the BIA or Indian Health 
Service”). 
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tribal-state consultations wherein the participants may discuss issues of 
common jurisdictional or regulatory concern.80  In more rare instances, the 
tribe and state may be motivated to enter into a formal legal agreement.  
For example, the two entities recently signed an oil and gas tax sharing 
agreement.81  Both parties deemed the agreement necessary to avoid the 
risk of the burdensome double taxation of those energy producers who are 
active within the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.82  The agreement also 
avoided the situation wherein each government imposed its own severance 
or production taxes on those activities within that reservation.83  Under the 
tribal-state agreement, a single, shared tax is imposed on energy 
production within the reservation.84  
 However, the tribe’s most important inter-governmental 
relationship will continue to be its trust-based relationship with the federal 
government.  While the tribe has made some progress in renewing the 
basis of its relationship with the federal government—particularly with 
regard to its efforts to reduce some of the federal regulatory barriers to the 
development of its oil and gas resources—there still remain significant 
administrative bottlenecks that tend to delay, if not frustrate, the timely 
and responsible development of the tribe’s energy resources.  The tribal 
chairman’s recent testimony before a congressional subcommittee detailed 
                                                 
80. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the “Deadliest 
Enemies” Model of Tribal-State Relations, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007) (encouraging 
Indian tribes to cautiously engage in an on-going system of tribal-state relations as one 
means of achieving their strategic objectives). 
81. Oil and Gas Agreement Between the Three Affiliated Tribes and 
State of North Dakota, available at www.ndgov/tax/oilgas/threeatribes/ 
pubs/oilgastaxagreement. [hereinafter Oil and Gas Agreement]. 
82. Id. at 2–3; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57–51.2. 
83.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57–51.2(2). 
84. See Tribes Ask for Bigger Share of ND Oil Tax, BISMARCK TRIB., 
Feb. 5, 2011, at B1, available at http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/2011-session/article_c6af5766-30aa-11e0-b74b-oo1cc4c002e0.html.  
However, the current tribal chairman, Tex Hall, wants to renegotiate its tax sharing 
agreement with North Dakota.  Under the existing 2008 agreement, the state gets 
eighty percent of the tax revenue from oil production on fee lands within the 
reservation and fifty percent of the tax revenue from production on tribal trust lands.  
Id.  Chairman Hall wants to amend that agreement so that the tribe would receive 
eighty percent of the tax revenue from tribal trust lands.  Id.  He contends the increased 
tribal responsibility for road repair and maintenance, protecting the public health, and 
employing more tribal staff justifies the amendment to the tax sharing agreement.  Id.  
From September 2008 to December 2010, the state received about $47.8 million in 
tax revenues on the reservation and the tribe received about $21.3 million.  Id.  State 
senator John Warner has recently introduced legislation seeks to amend the existing 
state-tribal tax sharing agreement.  Id.; see also Oil and Gas Tax Agreement, supra 
note 81. 
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several of these concerns.85  Those unresolved federal regulatory issues 
include: 
 
1. Improve the staffing at the Fort Berthold Agency and 
the Great Plains Regional Office so that all the responsible 
federal agencies are located in one place and they are 
thereby able to coordinate their respective functions and, 
hopefully, speed up the oil and gas exploration and 
leasing process on the reservation;86  
 
2. Appoint an allottee liaison so as to improve the 
communication process between the Interior Department 
and the 8000 allotted mineral owners on the reservation;87  
 
3. Streamline the regulatory process by requiring the 
standardization among the various federal agencies of the 
tribal and allottee lease numbers so that there will not be 
differing lease numbers assigned to the same parcel of 
allotted or tribal land on the reservation;88  
 
4. Modernize the Interior Department’s record keeping 
system so that fewer land title mistakes are made in the 
future and upgrade the Department’s filing and tracking 
system for leases, applications, and related approval 
requests;89  
 
5. Develop a large scale infrastructure solution that will 
ensure the collection and transportation of oil and gas 
produced by both the tribal and allotted wells on the 
reservation;90  
 
6. Ensure greater regulatory coordination with North 
                                                 
85. Oversight Hearing on Tribal Development of Energy Resources and 
the Creation of Energy Jobs on Indian Lands Before the H. Subcomm. on Indian and 
Alaska Native Affairs Committee on Natural Resources, 112th Cong 18–15 (2011) 
[hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Tex G. Hall, Chairman, Mandan, 
Hidatsa, & Arikara Nation of the Fort Berthold Reservation). 
86. Id. at 21–22. 
87.  Id. at 22. 
88.  Id. at 22–23. 
89.  Id. at 23. 
90.  Id. 
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Dakota so that all the oil and gas operators are certain as 
to which government—tribal, state, or federal—has 
regulatory jurisdiction over a given operator;91  
 
7. Improve the federal decision-making process through 
the development of a memorandum of understanding as 
between the four responsible federal agencies that share 
jurisdiction over oil and gas development on the 
reservation;92 and 
 
8. Ensure that any allotted mineral owner who is subject 
to a communitization agreement is paid her royalties at 
the same time as a non-Indian mineral owner who is in the 
same circumstances.93  
  
 The fair resolution by the federal government of these pending 
issues will help the tribe to better manage development on the reservation. 
 The tribe has already acted to leverage its energy resources as its 
means of establishing new strategic relationships with both the state and 
federal governments.  However, these new relationships have to be both 
nurtured and vigilantly monitored to ensure that the tribe’s interests are 
always respected and protected.  As a practical reality, the tribe’s 
relationship with the state will always be limited and episodic in nature.  
At most, the tribe will likely participate in informal consultations with the 
relevant state officials wherein information may be exchanged regarding 
each government’s respective development programs or their new 
regulatory initiatives.  Far more rarely, given the tribe’s appropriate 
sovereignty-based concerns, will the tribe and the state likely enter into 
any inter-jurisdictional or resource sharing agreements.94  
 By contrast, the tribe should seek to strengthen both its informal 
and formal relations with the federal government.  Its abiding legal and 
practical interests behoove it to secure from the federal government the 
funding, technical support, and federally derived authority that will enable 
it to better manage development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  
                                                 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93.  Id. 
94. Fletcher, supra note 80, at 80 (asserting that “[i]n the case of modern 
intergovernmental agreements, Indian tribes are not conceding jurisdiction over their 
entire territories to states—they are settling questions of jurisdictional dispute with the 
states by creating certainty through agreements where federal Indian law offers 
nothing more than gray areas”). 
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Therefore, given its two hundred years of relationship with the federal 
government, the tribe should seek to build upon its most important and 
enduring inter-governmental relationship.  However, the tribe should 
conscientiously develop this relationship as only one of its means of 
realizing its strategic goals within the overarching framework of the 
federal trust relationship.95  
 
3. The Tribe’s Strategy for Using Its Governmental and Corporate 
Powers to Accomplish Its Long-Term Goals 
  
 Development experts and legal scholars have counseled the 
energy rich tribes to wisely manage their sometimes substantial energy 
derived income.96  Unfortunately, some energy rich tribes have failed to 
heed that counsel.  Therefore, when the predictable energy bust does come, 
some tribes have little to show for the millions of dollars they may have 
received in energy derived income during the erstwhile energy boom.  The 
Three Affiliated Tribes, given the first initial phases of development 
occurring on its reservation, can hopefully avoid a similar fate.  Because 
much has been said about how a tribe should manage its energy derived 
income, I will focus my analysis on how the tribe can leverage its energy 
derived income to accomplish its other important strategic goals.97  
                                                 
95. See CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN 
INDIAN NATIONS 280–81 (2005) (describing the tribes’ challenge of “sovereignty 
building” whereby they must become “doggedly persistent in the gargantuan task of 
piecing [their] societies back together”). 
96. Tribal wealth management—whether the wealth is derived from 
gaming or energy development—is a hot topic in Indian Country.  At the macro-level, 
wise management of tribal wealth has “generated some 75,000 new jobs for tribal 
members . . . [and tribal wealth has] been funneled into many nongaming tribal 
ventures: museums, banks, hydroelectric dams, farms, hotels, restaurants, and grocery 
stores.”  Id. at 337.  At the micro-level, for example, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians’ 
decision to invest its tribal wealth in several “tribal enterprises, starting with a Best 
Western motel and restaurant on Interstate 65.”  Id. at 342. 
97. In general, the tribe may seek to emulate those strategic successes 
that have been realized by the Southern Ute Tribe in its management of its energy 
resources.  Its financial success derives from its conscientious establishment of several 
tribal development corporation.  One of these tribal corporations—known as the Red 
Willow Production Company—now “owns interests in nearly 1,000 [oil and gas] wells 
and works about half of those, making it one of the top natural gas producers in 
Colorado.”  Id. at 347.  Furthermore, he asserts that another tribal corporation—Red 
Cedar Gathering Company—“now owns more than 700 miles of pipelines, moving 
about [one] percent of the nation’s daily natural gas supply.”  Id. 
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 Given its status as an IRA-chartered entity,98 the Three Affiliated 
Tribes has significant governmental and corporate powers that it can 
leverage to achieve several strategic goals that may benefit its tribal 
people.  Pursuant to section 17 of the IRA, it can charter a tribal 
development corporation that may be authorized to exercise an 
independent and professional business judgment in its management of 
tribal assets that have been entrusted to its administration.99  Indeed, the 
tribe has apparently used this authority to establish a tribal development 
entity, known as Missouri River Resources.  This tribal business entity—
according to its organic documents—is intended to perform the same 
development functions that have been so successfully performed by some 
of the Southern Ute Tribe’s development corporations.100  
                                                 
98. Karen Atkinson and Kathleen Niles describe the general powers of 
IRA chartered tribal corporation as follows: 
 
Section 17 corporations are tribal in character, they must be 
wholly-owned by the tribe and are essentially alter egos of the 
tribal government . . . . The corporate charters may convey the 
following powers to the incorporated entity: 
 
• Power to buy and sell real and personal property; including 
the power to purchase restricted Indian lands 
• To enter into leases or mortgages of tribal land for a term 
of 25 years without Section 81 approval by the Secretary of 
the Interior 
• To enter into contracts or agreements without Section 81 
approval by the Secretary of the Interior 
• Further powers as may be necessary to the conduct of 
corporate business. 
 
See KAREN J. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN MILES, TRIBAL BUSINESS STRUCTURE 
HANDBOOK III-12 (2008), available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tribal_business_ 
structures_handbook.pdf (internal footnotes and quotations omitted). 
99. S. Chloe Thompson, Exercising and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty in 
Day-to-Day Business Operations: What the Key Players Need to Know, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 661, 689 (2010).  Tribes should also consider having their business 
enterprises “run by a politically autonomous body . . . separate from the tribal 
governing body.”  Id. at 693.  But, regardless of how the tribal businesses are 
structured, they must lay “the framework for the consistent assertion and protection of 
tribal sovereignty.”  Id. at 695. 
100. See MISSOURI RIVER RESOURCES, BUSINESS PLAN 5 (Dec. 2010), 
available at http://missouririverresources.com/files/mrr_Business_Plan_pdf.  The 
tribal business plan for this company, Missouri River Resources, states that the tribe 
“wish[es] to proceed with the formation of a [t]ribal oil and gas company to allow the 
[tribe] to actively participate in the exploration of the oil and gas resources located on 
lands within the Fort Berthold reservation, and to gain greater control over the 
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 However, while some tribal development corporations have 
become extremely successful business institutions, many other tribal 
development corporations have either floundered or failed.  Indian 
development experts have offered no sure fire managerial recipe that will 
make a particular tribal development corporation successful, but there are 
at least two essential ingredients to a successful tribal enterprise: (1) an 
unswerving commitment to obtaining what the tribal people will need to 
survive and flourish and (2) the tribal leadership’s incorruptible and 
unyielding will to bend its governmental and corporate powers to the 
realization of this long-term goal.  Furthermore, the tribe’s leadership must 
objectively identify and empower only those tribal enterprises that have a 
demonstrated capacity to contribute meaningfully to the realization of the 
tribe’s overarching strategic goal.101  
 Therefore, the tribe, in assessing its alternative corporate-based 
opportunities, has to carefully determine which of those opportunities can 
serve as a vehicle for achieving its long-term goals.  For example, the tribe 
could assess whether North Dakota’s establishment of its Legacy Fund—
its vehicle for the investment of a significant portion of its energy revenues 
into a permanent and diversified wealth fund102—should serve as a model 
that it may choose to emulate.  The fund’s strategic goal is to leverage 
today’s state energy revenues as its long-term means to create new and 
better social and economic options for both its present and future 
                                                 
development of the resources.”  Id.  The tribe’s overall goal is “to build an oil and gas 
exploration and production company, with initial recoverable reserves of 500,000 
Bbl.”  Id.  The tribe’s hope is that this company “will provide a significant base for 
the [t]ribe to increase control over the oil and gas activities on the [r]eservation, 
develop a legacy for future growth and expansion, and provide quality opportunities 
for Tribal members to participate in this dynamic venture.”  Id. 
101. Thompson, supra note 99, at 714 (acknowledging the tribes’ new 
corporate endeavors increase the “risk of direct challenges to their sovereignty” and 
remarking on the irony that it has been “tribal sovereignty and self-determination . . . 
that have enabled [tribal] economic growth”). 
102. See Legacy Fund Gets Its Start, BISMARCK TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://bismarcktribune.com/news/opinion/editorial/legacy-fund-gets-its-
start/article_65cef2e0-dd56-11e0-983a-001cc4c03286.html.  North Dakota voters 
approved the establishment of the North Dakota Legacy Fund.  Indeed, the first 
deposit, some $34.3 million, has already been placed into that fund.  Id.  By the fund’s 
terms, none of the deposited monies can be spent until June 2017 and, in any event, 
no more than fifteen percent of those funds can be spent in any biennium.  Id.  
However, some critics have asked why those monies are deposited in an account with 
the Bank of North Dakota that earns only one percent interest.  Id.  There is 
considerable optimism about the fund’s future given that “[d]aily crude oil production 
hit 423,550 barrels in July [2011], 40,000 barrels a day more than in June.”  Id. 
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generations of North Dakotans.103  Similarly, the tribe could choose to use 
its oil and gas income as its means of leveraging the tribal people’s future 
social and economic options.  These leveraged options could include better 
tribal educational opportunities, improved tribal health care, an adequately 
funded tribal land consolidation initiative, and more tribal funding for 
individually owned business enterprises.  However, some Indian 
development experts emphasize that a majority of the tribal people must 
buy in to any proposed tribal development strategy.  Only if the tribal 
people are persuaded that a given tribal development strategy is governed 
by an incorruptible and unyielding commitment to the improvement of 
their lives, will they give it their unqualified support.104  
 
4. The Tribe’s Strategy for Building Its Human and Social Capital 
Resources 
  
 The tribe may direct some portion of its energy derived income to 
the building of the tribal people’s human and social capital resources. 
Development experts have not said much about this tribal strategic 
opportunity, but it may be the tribe’s most important strategic goal.  To 
achieve this goal, the tribe must engage its tribal people as those politically 
and socially responsible stakeholders who will be directly responsible for 
the rebuilding of the tribe’s families, communities, and traditional cultural 
associations.  How the tribe can leverage its energy resources so as to 
develop the tribal people’s human and social capital resources is discussed 
in the following sections. 
  
a. Articulating Its Strategic Vision 
  
 The tribe can accomplish its strategic goal through the 
establishment of an appropriately capitalized and professionally managed 
tribal wealth fund, but this initiative can only succeed with the tribal 
people’s understanding and assent.  Therefore, it may, via several 
reservation-wide forums, engage the tribal people in a frank and open 
discussion as to what a proposed tribal wealth fund should look like and 
how it should be administered.  There will likely be some tribal members 
who advocate for the immediate per capita-based payment of the tribe’s 
energy derived income to the tribal people.  In response, the tribe may 
                                                 
103. Id. 
104. WILKINSON, supra note 95, at 280 (contending the “combination of 
public involvement and accountability requires [tribal] elected officials to do much 
walking of the membership, as it is called, and contributes to a buy-in by the 
membership of tribal decisions”). 
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choose to immediately devote some of its energy derived income to fund 
small tribal opportunity grants or loans that will enable qualified tribal 
members to directly participate in the new oil and gas industry.  Through 
its provision of targeted grants or loans, the tribe can help tribal members 
who want to start small business enterprises, who want to obtain the 
required technical training and skills to compete in the energy industry, or 
who want to obtain tools and equipment that are required for work in that 
industry.  By assisting its qualified tribal members in their efforts to 
participate in the new energy economy, the tribe can demonstrate its 
commitment to building its people’s capacity to directly benefit from this 
new industry on the reservation. 
 Only through its steadfast adherence to its overall strategic goal 
can the tribe successfully use any given means, such as a tribal wealth 
fund, to leverage the development of the tribal people’s human and social 
capital resources.  In this light, the tribe’s new oil wealth will serve as its 
strategic foil for provoking the tribal people to debate and discuss how 
they can, and will, participate in the achievement of this overarching 
strategic goal.105  In the next section, I describe how the tribe may seek to 
engage its tribal members as direct stakeholders who have a legitimate 
right to participate in the design of the tribe’s plan for the future use of its 
revenues derived from oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold 
Reservation. 
  
b. Power Sharing with the Tribal Communities 
  
 The tribe can also leverage its energy resources as a means of 
encouraging the tribal communities and the traditional culturally-based 
associations to take greater responsibility for managing development’s 
impacts and risks on the reservation.  Although the tribe’s IRA charter and 
constitution seemingly centralizes governmental and corporate decision 
making within the tribal council,106 the centralization does not prohibit the 
tribe from taking affirmative and voluntary actions to share its decision-
                                                 
105. See WILLIAM ISAACS, DIALOGUE AND THE ART OF THINKING 
TOGETHER 272–73 (1999) (contending that any people or group, including tribal 
people, will benefit from the practice of “reflective dialogue”).  The reflective 
dialogue-based process requires all of the participants therein to reflect on what they 
are doing and the impact they are having on others.  Id.  “People [in this dialogue] are 
now willing to examine the rules that have governed how they have operated.  They 
are prepared to begin to explore the nature of the structures that guide their behavior 
and action, and they do so increasingly publicly.”  Id. 
106. See Corporate Charter of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. 
Berthold Reservation, N.D., ratified Apr. 24, 1937; Const. and Bylaws of the Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation art. VI. 
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making powers with those tribal communities and groups that will bear the 
brunt of future development on the reservation.  Its power sharing efforts 
can also serve to rebalance, in a culturally and politically appropriate 
manner, the IRA’s overly centralized governmental structures.  Therefore, 
the tribe may consider the following steps toward a new political 
engagement with its tribal members.107  
 The first step is power sharing with the unduly impacted tribal 
communities and groups.  The tribe may accord to those heavily impacted 
tribal communities and groups a decision-making role in the design of a 
tribal energy policy that is intended to mitigate development’s intrusive 
effects.  Beyond this power sharing step, the tribe may consider how it can 
empower other tribal communities and groups—through, for example, the 
tribal chartering and funding of new community development 
associations—so that they too can take a greater responsibility for building 
the tribal people’s human and social capital resources.108  
 The second step is engagement with the younger tribal members.  
The tribe may also leverage its energy resources as its means for engaging 
its most gifted and qualified young tribal men and women.  It could, for 
example, stimulate their commitment to tribal public service through 
targeted employment and internship opportunities with the various tribal 
energy focused departments and agencies.  These tribal efforts would seek 
to grow a cadre of new, young tribal administrators and leaders who 
would, over time, become qualified to lead the tribal people towards their 
new economic and social future.  Furthermore, this tribal effort would 
contribute to building those young people’s social and technical skills so 
as to qualify them for future leadership positions within the tribal 
government.109  
 The tribe’s success in leveraging its energy resources to achieve 
its strategic objectives is—as has been observed by development 
experts—as crucial to both the maximization of development’s benefits 
and the minimization of development’s costs to the tribal people. 
 
  
                                                 
107. The tribe, for example, may want to adopt the suggested democratic 
mechanism of a tribal referendum on “large [tribal] expenditures and matters of great 
importance.”  WILKINSON, supra note 95, at 280. 
108. “Sovereignty building,” as Charles Wilkinson calls it, is the joint 
responsibility of the tribal people and their leadership.  He quotes law professor Frank 
Pommersheim who describes this process as embodying the “legal and ethical thrust 
of [the] Indian people to develop and to improve their institutions and government.”  
Id. at 283. 
109. Id. 
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V.  THE TRIBE’S GOVERNMENTAL INITIATIVE TO REGULATE 
DEVELOPMENT ON THE FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN 
RESERVATION 
 
 Large-scale oil and gas development, even on the Fort Berthold 
Indian Reservation, can be managed in a legally and socially responsible 
manner.  However, the Three Affiliated Tribes, due to its quasi-sovereign 
status within the reservation, is the only entity with the will and the interest 
to take on this challenge.  Indeed, the tribal chairman, in his recent 
congressional testimony, expressed the tribe’s goal of maximizing 
development’s benefits, while minimizing its eco-social costs, to the tribal 
people of this reservation.110  His testimony restates the overarching 
rationale that is now routinely invoked to justify governmental regulation 
of oil and gas development throughout the United States.111  
 
A. Efficiency and Fairness as the Basis for Today’s Governmental 
Regulation of Oil and Gas Development 
 
 The tribe, like other responsible governments, seeks to balance 
two potentially conflicting governmental goals.  First, it seeks to ensure 
that development is done in a reasonably efficient manner that will avoid 
any undue physical or economic waste of its energy resources.  Second, it 
                                                 
110. Oversight Hearing, supra note 85, at 19.  Chairman Hall, in his 
testimony before a congressional oversight committee that was conducting a hearing 
on energy development on Indian lands, made these following remarks: 
 
As the [c]hairman of the MHA Nation, I now have the 
responsibility for our tribal lands as well as our individual Indian 
lands.  Our focus must be on maximizing the economic benefit that 
the MHA Nation and its members can receive from the oil and gas 
resources under our lands.  At the same time, our lands must be 
protected by appropriate federal and tribal regulations, adopted and 
enforced on a cooperative basis, which protects our environment 
and our people. 
 
Id. 
111. State oil and gas conservation laws strive to balance the goal of 
resource development with the goal of environmental protection.  Whether these state 
conservation laws actually realize a fair balance between these competing goals is a 
matter of on-going debate.  See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO PROTECT WATER SOURCES 8 (May 2009), available at 
http://www.gwpc.org/elibrary/documents/general/State% 
20Oil%C20and%C20Gas%C20Regulations%C20Designed%C20to%C20Protect%C
20Water%Resources.pdf. 
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seeks to ensure that development does not cause any undue environmental 
or other harm to the tribal people or their lands and resources.112  Not 
surprisingly, virtually all contemporary resource conservation laws 
likewise express this goal of balanced resource development.  These laws, 
for example, routinely prohibit any resource development that will cause 
undue harm to the surrounding environment.113  
 But, as a practical reality, the degree to which any given 
government actually enforces this regulatory ideal, through its on the 
ground application of its conservation policies and practices, depends on 
its underlying social and economic priorities.114  Similarly, the Three 
Affiliated Tribe’s conservation-based initiatives will likely be somewhat 
influenced by its own evolving economic and social priorities with regard 
to development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  The tribal 
people’s direct interest in ensuring the wise use and investment of these 
tribal oil revenues will likely motivate them to fully participate in an on-
going tribal dialogue regarding the best use of these funds. 
 
B. What the Tribe Can Learn from Its Review of Oil and Gas 
Conservation Laws 
 
 The tribe, as its initial regulatory step, should review the general 
regulatory structure of contemporary oil and gas conservation laws.  As a 
general matter, today’s state resource conservation laws share a 
remarkably similar regulatory structure.  This similarity is evidenced by 
their typical provisions regulating: (a) the permitting process for oil and 
gas wells; (b) well construction standards; (c) the hydraulic fracturing 
process; (d) the temporary abandonment of oil and gas wells; (e) the 
plugging of oil and gas wells; (f) oil and gas storage tanks; (g) the 
construction and maintenance of waste or other types of pits; and (h) waste 
handling and spills.115  
 Furthermore, these state conservation laws routinely delegate to 
their respective regulatory agencies the job of managing the energy 
industry within their states.  These agencies, as part and parcel of their 
delegated regulatory authority, are empowered to develop detailed 
regulations as their means of enforcing their respective state’s 
conservation laws.  Therefore, they carry out their regulatory duties 
through the medium of detailed regulations, formal and informal guidance 
documents, local field rules, and an evolving set of best management 
                                                 
112.  Oversight Hearing, supra note 85, at 19. 
113.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 111, at 6. 
114.  Id. 
115. Id. 
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practices.  Furthermore, they conduct field inspections and related 
regulatory oversight, which may include the actual witnessing of 
significant operations such as well construction, testing, and plugging.116  
 However, some critics do argue that the dual regulatory goals of 
resource development and environmental protection have proven, in 
practice, to be inherently incompatible.  They further contend that the 
states’ regulatory agencies tend to be biased in favor of energy production 
and against the reasonable needs of environmental protection.117  For that 
reason, the tribe may want to consider some additional environmental 
safeguards as its means of balancing the possibly competing goals of 
resource development and environmental protection on the reservation. 
 
C. What Environmental Safeguards Will Adequately Address the 
Distinctive Social and Environmental Needs of the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation 
 
 The tribe may consider, as its second regulatory step, the 
following environmental safeguards that seek to achieve a balance 
between promoting development, on the one hand, and protecting the 
environmental interests of the tribal people, on the other hand.  These 
environmental safeguards may also directly address those distinctive risks 
that are presented by types of oil and gas extraction technologies—
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing—that are now in use on the 
reservation.118  These suggested safeguards include the following: 
 
1. Protection of tribal surface owners’ rights: The tribe 
may require developers to protect tribal surface owners by 
giving them advance written notice (e.g., thirty days prior 
to any proposed surface disturbance) of any proposed 
surface disturbance and by paying them damages for any 
loss of income due to crop loss or for other injuries to their 
surface resources;119  
 
2. Protection of tribal and allotted water supplies: The 
tribe may require developers to protect tribal or allotted 
water supplies from pollution or undue waste by 
                                                 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 8. 
118. See ARK. PUB. POLICY PANEL, MODEL OIL AND GAS LAWS, 
REGULATIONS AND ORDINANCES 1 (Mar. 2011), available at http://www. 
ARPanel.org/content/Model%20Gas%Laws.pdf. 
119.  Id. 
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conducting appropriate water quality and quantity studies 
of development’s impact on tribal and allotted water 
supplies, both before and during the development 
process;120  
 
3. Protection of tribal and allotted ground water supplies 
from contamination by the hydraulic fracturing process: 
The tribe may require developers to protect tribal and 
allotted groundwater supplies from any contamination 
from the hydraulic fracturing process through their 
adherence to adequate well casing and cementing 
standards;121  
 
4. Protection of tribal air resources: The tribe may require 
developers to use the best available technologies and 
industry practices to reduce or eliminate any health 
related threats to the tribal residents from any emissions 
that occur during the development process;122  
 
5. Protection of tribal residents from undue noise: The 
tribe may require developers to protect tribal residents 
from any undue noise that may occur during the 
development process through their adherence to an 
appropriate noise standard (e.g., a standard measured in 
decibel units);123  
 
6. Tribal well inspection requirements: The tribe may 
require a well to be inspected prior to production, while 
hydraulic fracturing is occurring on a well, and before a 
well is reclaimed;124  
 
7. Disclosure of drilling chemicals used in the hydraulic 
fracturing process: The tribe may require developers to 
disclose the Chemical Abstract Service (“CAS”) number 
and the volume of each substance used by those 
developers in the hydraulic fracturing process;125  
                                                 
120.  Id. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124. Id. at 2. 
125.  Id. 
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8. Well site reclamation requirements: The tribe may 
require developers to ensure the timely reclamation of any 
abandoned well site by the posting of a bond that is equal 
to the cost of plugging and reclaiming any abandoned well 
site;126 and 
 
9. Best management practices requirements: The tribe 
may require developers to use the best available 
technology and management practices so as to minimize 
any risks or threats to the tribal environment.127  
  
 The tribe should assess whether, given the local conditions that 
govern oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 
all of these environmental and health related requirements may be 
necessary to protect the interests and rights of the tribal residents.  Further, 
the tribe may consult with the BIA, EPA, and BLM to determine whether 
the federal government’s existing regulatory structure that governs oil and 
gas development deals adequately with these environmental and health 
related interests on the reservation.  The tribe, like other responsible 
governments, understandably seeks to balance its development and 
conservation goals.  Striking the right balance between these sometimes 
competing goals requires the tribe to exercise its regulatory discretion in 
manner that gives due consideration to each of these respective goals. 
  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
 The tribe has already taken some important regulatory steps.  It 
has, for example, established a tribal energy office that now performs 
important data gathering functions.128  It also serves as a liaison between 
the oil and gas developers, the tribal mineral rights owners, the federal 
government, and the tribal people.129  The tribe has also adopted an interim 
Hazardous Waste Disposal ordinance that seeks to deter the unauthorized 
dumping or disposal of any waste materials from the exploration or 
production of oil and gas on the reservation.130  However, the tribe may 
                                                 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See e.g., Ogden supra note 5. 
129. GROGAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 41 (asserting the tribal energy office 
“acts mostly as a facilitator and clearinghouse, communicating . . . [with the relevant 
federal and state energy regulatory offices] . . . on behalf of the tribe”). 
130.  See THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES ENVIRONMENTAL CODE ch. 15.1 
(2011) (on file with author). 
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have to take further and more substantial regulatory steps if it wants to 
ensure that development is regulated in a legally and socially responsible 
manner on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  To do so, the tribe would 
likely confront a complex and potentially costly undertaking, but, as I have 
recommended, the tribe could accomplish its strategic goals in a deliberate 
and incremental fashion. 
 Furthermore, whether the Three Affiliated Tribes will prove to be 
development’s victim or its beneficiary will depend on its success in 
subjecting oil and gas development to reasonable legal and social 
regulation.  If it succeeds in this effort, the tribal people can use 
development’s many benefits to help ensure a brighter social and 
economic future for themselves and for their future generations.  If it does 
not succeed in this effort, development’s growing risks and impacts may 
jeopardize the progress the tribal people have made in their recovery from 
the disastrous effects of the Garrison Dam taking some sixty years ago. 
 However, there is reason for optimism because both the federal 
and state governments have an important stake in helping the tribe regulate 
oil and gas development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.  Given 
that these two governments are motivated by their interest in ensuring the 
responsible development of the Bakken formation, they may also 
acknowledge the tribe as an indispensable regulatory partner in the 
realization of this common goal. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
